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This paper analyzes the impact of declining extraction costs of shale oil
producers on the choice of the policy instrument of a climate coalition in the
presence of a monopolistic oil supplier such as OPEC. Shale oil producers’
extraction costs represent an upper bound for the oil price OPEC can charge.
Declining extraction costs ultimately limit OPEC’s price setting behavior and
thus impacts the optimal climate policy of the climate coalition.
A pure cap-and-trade system is weakly welfare-inferior relative to a carbon
tax for the climate coalition. While high extraction costs allow OPEC to
appropriate the whole climate rent in case of quantity regulation, declining
extraction costs imply OPEC to capture only a part of the climate rent. A
carbon tax always generates positive revenue and thus is welfare-superior
in general. However, low extraction costs prevent OPEC from exerting its
market power, leading the climate coalition to implement the Pigouvian tax
in the first place. Both market-based instruments are equivalent in this case.
Complementing a quota with a base tax cannot outperform a pure carbon
tax.
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1 Introduction
In the Paris Agreement from 2015, the conference of the parties called for ’holding the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦C above pre-industrial levels’
(UNFCCC 2015: Art. 2a) as suggested by the latest reports of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) and agreed to limit the exhaust of greenhouse
gas emissions. Aiming at overcoming the free rider problem that is at the heart of global
warming, each country put forward country-specific emissions reduction targets as a first
step of coordinated action. Limiting global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions necessarily
impacts the demand for fossil fuels because the vast majority of CO2 emissions stem
from the combustion of fossil fuels. Thus, coordinated climate action by the major fossil
fuel consuming countries can also be thought of as forming a climate coalition that acts
as a demand cartel in the fossil fuel market. At the same time, any regulation of CO2
emissions inevitably affects the supply of the owners of fossil fuels such as oil.
The oil market is characterized by the market power of the extractors, where the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounts for almost half
of the world’s oil production and nearly 75% of proven oil reserves, leaving OPEC as
the dominant player in the oil market. Given the market power of OPEC and the
demand cartel in form of the climate coalition, the market structure in the oil market
can be characterized as a bilateral monopoly. Under this market structure, previous
papers find that the climate coalition is strictly better off under a carbon tax than
under a cap-and-trade system. Intuitively, a fixed quota causes the effective demand
for fossil fuels to be more inelastic, which allows OPEC to extract a higher share of
the climate rent, thereby leaving less revenue for the climate coalition. However, OPEC
is not the sole supplier of oil, but faces increasing competition due to the evolution
of the shale oil industry. Even though the extraction costs of shale oil are still much
higher than those of OPEC’s conventional oil, technological progress in the shale oil
industry has dramatically decreased the extraction costs within the last years. This
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paper explores the consequences of declining extraction costs of OPEC’s competitors on
the rent distribution between the climate coalition and OPEC as well as the implications
for the choice of the climate policy instrument.
Many countries, among which there are major emitters of CO2, such as the European
Union, China and some U.S. states, have already launched or are planning to launch
emissions trading schemes. Thus, it seems to be very likely that cap-and-trade turns
out as the predominant climate policy instrument. However, the economics literature
predominantly favors a carbon tax over cap-and-trade for various reasons.1 One reason
for this preference is the existence of market power in the oil market, first explored by
Berger et al. (1992). Accounting for OPEC’s dominant role with respect to its competi-
tors within a competitive fringe model, Berger et al. (1992) analyze OPEC’s reaction
towards carbon taxes and quotas for a given level of CO2 emissions. Strand (2009)
endogenizes the level of CO2 emissions for both instruments, but does not incorporate
fossil fuel producers other than OPEC. This paper fills the research gap between both
papers by deriving the optimal level of CO2 emissions (in contrast to Berger et al. 1992)
and accounting for the impact of the competitive fringe (in contrast to Strand 2009) on
the choice of the policy instrument.
Following Berger et al. (1992) and Strand (2009), the research question is answered
within a static setting, where the two players, i.e. the climate coalition and OPEC,
strategically interact with each other due to their dominant roles in the oil market.
The shale oil industry is assumed to have positive constant marginal extraction costs
higher than those of OPEC. The extraction costs then represent an upper bound for the
oil price that OPEC can charge. If these costs are declining, so does the upper bound,
which ultimately limits the price setting behavior of OPEC and thus impacts the optimal
climate policy of the climate coalition.
Given the market power of OPEC, its reaction towards climate policy differs between
1See Goulder and Schein 2013 for a recent review.
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a carbon tax and a fixed quota, which is why the climate coalition generally prefers one
instrument over the other. In particular, as pointed out by Berger et al. (1992), OPEC’s
reaction towards a fixed quota is to marginally undercut that quota, which drives the
permit price to zero and leaves no revenue for the climate coalition. This result also
holds true in this paper as long as the fringe’s marginal extraction costs are sufficiently
high. For low extraction costs, OPEC still marginally undercuts the quota, but can
capture only a part of the climate rent because the oil price is limited by the fringe’s
extraction costs.
Relative to a quota, a carbon tax generates positive revenue for the government and
thus is welfare-superior for the climate coalition in general. However, low extraction costs
of the fringe prevent OPEC from charging the monopolistic price and from exerting its
market power. By anticipating this, the climate coalition optimally implements the
Pigouvian tax in the first place and it turns out that the price and quantity instruments
are equivalent in this case. However, for high extraction costs, the climate coalition
strictly prefers the carbon tax, implying price regulation to weakly dominate quantity
regulation. Complementing the quantity regulation by a base tax, as proposed by Scho¨b
(2010), allows the climate coalition to retain some of the carbon revenue, but cannot
outperform the pure price regulation.
1.1 Related literature
In a dynamic setting, early papers focused on using import tariffs to capture exporter’s
resource rents starting with Bergstrom (1982) and Karp and Newbery (1991).2 More
recently, several papers have discussed climate policy as a means to capture foreign
resource rents (Wirl 1995, Wirl and Dockner 1995, Amundsen and Scho¨b 1999, Rubio
and Escriche 2001, Liski and Tahvonen 2004 and Eisenack et al. 2012). Wirl (2012)
2Keutiben (2014) analyzes the impact of a competitive fringe of oil suppliers on the optimal import
tariff and finds that the presence of competitors enhances the ability of the importer to capture the
exporter’s resource rent.
4
explicitly compares price and quantity strategies within a dynamic game between a
climate coalition and OPEC and finds that both players are better off under the price
strategy. Karp et al. (2015) extends this model by incorporating a non-strategic third
country that also consumes oil, but does not belong to the climate coalition. Even this
small extension prevents the derivation of any qualitative result and forces the authors
to solve the problem numerically. Hence, some authors have started using static settings
in order to analyze more complex scenarios such as the incorporation of a competitive
fringe.
Berger et al. (1992) were the first to analyze the reaction of a dominant oil supplier
towards price and quantity instruments while accounting for a competitive fringe. In
the absence of the fringe, OPEC’s best reaction towards a fixed quota is to marginally
undercut that quota, thereby extracting the whole climate rent and leaving no carbon
revenue for the climate coalition. In contrast, a carbon tax generates some revenue for
the importing countries, which is why it is welfare-superior to a cap-and-trade system.
Incorporating a competitive fringe that supplies oil at increasing marginal extraction
costs causes the residual demand to turn downwards, forcing OPEC to reduce its price.
However, the effective demand in the case of quantity regulation remains perfectly in-
elastic at the quota, which allows OPEC to charge a higher price relative to a carbon
tax, implying a carbon tax to continue to be preferred by the importing countries. While
Berger et al. (1992) compare price and quantity regulation for an exogenously given level
of oil consumption, the present paper derives the welfare-optimal oil quantities for each
policy instrument and contrasts the respective welfare levels.
Strand (2009) endogenizes the oil consumption by maximizing the climate coalition’s
welfare, but does not incorporate a competitive fringe into his analysis. As in Berger
et al. (1992), quantity regulation allows OPEC to capture the whole climate rent. An-
ticipating this, the climate coalition may find it optimal to reduce the quota to zero. A
marginal increase of the quota starting at zero increases the utility from oil consump-
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tion, but this welfare gain is entirely captured by OPEC. Since the permit price is zero,
the climate coalition suffers a welfare loss due to the additional damage from global
warming. However, raising the quota beyond zero may eventually improve the climate
coalition’s welfare because it forces OPEC to reduce its oil price in order to capture the
climate rent, which finally leads to an increase of the consumer surplus. If the consumer
surplus outweighs the damage from global warming, then the climate coalition optimally
implements a positive quota equal to the quantity that an unregulated monopolist would
choose. Any quota beyond that quantity is ineffective because OPEC would optimally
reduce its supply accordingly. Since a cap-and-trade system does not generate any rev-
enue, whereas a carbon tax leaves some revenue for the climate coalition, Strand (2009)
concludes that price regulation strictly dominates quantity regulation.
In order to retain some revenue from the cap-and-trade system, Scho¨b (2010) proposes
to complement the quota by a base tax. He finds that this dual instrument enables the
climate coalition to generate the same revenue as from implementing a carbon tax. In
contrast to Scho¨b (2010), the present paper derives the optimal level of oil consumption
while accounting for a competitive fringe.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model that
is used to analyze the research question. Section 3 compares a carbon tax with a cap-
and-trade system and works out the impact of the competitive fringe on the choice of
the climate policy instrument. In Section 4, the dual instrument that complements the




Following Berger et al. (1992) and Strand (2009), I set up a static model, which is
appropriate as long as the analysis covers the medium run, i.e. the next 20 to 30 years.3
There are two groups of countries: the climate coalition and a cartelized group of fossil
fuel exporters such as OPEC. OPEC is assumed to be the dominant oil producer, whereas
the climate coalition as a demand cartel is the sole oil consumer, but also hosts a number
of small firms that extract oil at higher marginal costs than OPEC.4
The timing of the game is the following. First, the climate coalition chooses the
policy instrument and sets the level of the carbon tax or the quota respectively. Second,
OPEC moves by determining its exporter price or its quantity. This timing reflects the
fact that international climate negotiations that involve many countries take much more
time than the coordination of a small subgroup of fossil fuel exporting countries that have
already been cooperating for several years. Third, the competitive fringe determines its
extraction amount. The problem is solved by backwards induction.
3. Stage: Competitive fringe
The competitive fringe represents small competitive firms, operating in the shale-oil
industry. All firms take the resource price net of taxes p as given and are assumed to
have the same constant marginal extraction costs c > 0. They maximize their profits




∞ if p > c
[0,∞] if p = c
0 if p < c.
(1)
3Even though the extraction of fossil fuels is inherently a dynamic problem, which requires dynamic
solution techniques, I take the warning of Wirl (2012) seriously, who states that ’any substantial
extension may render closed form solutions impossible or intractable’ (Wirl 2012, p. 227).
4As shown by Strand (2013), the qualitative results do not alter when introducing a second non-strategic
oil consuming country which can be thought of as rest of world.
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2. Stage: OPEC
As a dominant player in the oil market, OPEC decides upon its extraction before all
other firms move, taking the policy of the climate coalition as given. For simplicity,
the marginal extraction costs of OPEC are normalized to zero, reflecting the fact that
OPEC’s extraction costs are still far below those of its competitors.5 In contrast to the
climate coalition, OPEC does not care about the damage from global warming caused
by the combustion of fossil fuels. Let q = p+ t be the consumer price with t be the price
of carbon (either tax or permit price) and R(q) as well as q(R) be the (inverse) demand
for oil, then the profits of OPEC read
pi(p, t) = pR(p+ t) and pi(R, t) = (q(R)− t)R. (2)
As will be shown in the next section, OPEC’s profit maximizing strategy depends on
the choice of the policy instrument of the climate coalition.
1. Stage: Climate coalition
The climate coalition is the sole consumer of oil. The utility of the representative con-
sumer of a representative country belonging to the climate coalition is characterized by
decreasing marginal utility. Even though most of the results of this paper can be also
derived using a general utility function, I follow Strand (2009) and assume the utility
to be linear-quadratic in order to obtain closed-form solutions that allow for explicit
welfare comparisons. The utility function reads
U(R) = aR− (1/2)γR2, (3)
which leads to a linear demand function. Taking the consumer price for oil q as given,
the representative consumer maximizes her utility and the demand function as well as
5In fact, marginal extraction costs of OPEC are not zero, but positive ranging from 3 USD/barrel (bbl)
for Saudi Arabia to 20 USD/bbl for Venezuela and are far below the marginal extraction costs of
shale-oil, which are estimated to be around 70 USD/bbl according to Knoema (2014).
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the inverse demand function are given by
max
R
U(R)− qR ⇔ q(R) = a− γR and R(q) = (1/γ)(a− q). (4)
The climate coalition experiences damage from global warming that arises from the
combustion of fossil fuels. For simplicity, the combustion of one unit of oil is assumed
to emit one unit of CO2, causing a constant marginal environmental damage of ψ. This
reflects the basic characteristics of climate change in the medium term. In the following,
I assume ψ < a, meaning that the marginal environmental damage is lower than the
marginal utility of the first unit of oil.
Assuming the tax revenues to be redistributed lump-sum to the consumers, the social
welfare of the climate coalition is based on a national concept, consisting of the consumer
surplus, the lump-sum transfers and the environmental damage. The welfare function is
given by
W (R, p) = aR− (1/2)γR2 − pR− ψR, (5)
where the tax payments and the lump-sum transfers cancel out. The global welfare
maximum, i.e. the maximum of the joint welfare of the climate coalition and OPEC, is
given by Rfb = (1/γ)(a − ψ). However, due to the opposing incentives of the climate
coalition and OPEC, the first-best will not be achieved as long as the players do not
cooperate when choosing their policies. In principle, the climate coalition may maximize
its national welfare either by a price or a quantitiy instrument. However, the reaction
of OPEC is different in both cases as will be seen in the next section.
3 Comparing climate policy instruments
This section compares a carbon tax with a cap-and-trade system. Let us first summarize
the analysis without the competitive fringe as in the model of Strand (2009).
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3.1 Prices versus quantities without a competitive fringe
The choice of the climate policy instrument in the first stage impacts OPEC’s reaction
in the second stage as shown in Figure 1.












Figure 1 depicts the inverse demand function q(R), the inverse demand function less
the tax q(R)− t¯, the marginal revenues MR(0) and MR(t¯), the quantity of the unreg-
ulated monopolist RM , the quota R¯ < RM and the effective demand function Re(q, R¯).
Imposing a quota causes the effective demand for OPEC to be kinked at (R¯, q(R¯)) so
that OPEC’s optimal reaction is to supply R¯ at a price q(R¯).6 Charging a price of q(R¯)
drives the permit price to zero, implying the climate coalition to generate no revenue
and OPEC to extract the whole climate rent.7
If the climate coalition was to impose R¯ by a carbon tax, it would need to implement
a tax level of t¯, so that OPEC’s marginal revenue equals its marginal costs at R¯. In this
6OPEC cannot sell more than R¯, even if it was to reduce its price. Raising the price above q(R¯) is also
not optimal because the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal costs (zero) for all R¯ < RM .
7When permits are auctioned to the consumers, the permit price emerges as the difference between the
consumer price q(R) and the price that OPEC charges.
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case, OPEC optimally charges an oil price of q(R¯) − t¯, leaving a positive tax revenue
equal to t¯ · R¯ for the climate coalition. Formally, OPEC’s best response towards any
carbon tax and the climate coalition’s optimal carbon tax read
max
p
pi(p, t) ⇔ po(t) = (1/2)(a− t) (6)
max
t
W (R(po(t) + t), po(t)) ⇔ to = ψ + (1/3)(a− ψ). (7)
The optimal carbon tax to is higher than the Pigouvian tax tP = ψ because the climate
coalition does not only internalize the environmental damage, but also appropriates some
of OPEC’s monopolistic rent by raising the tax above the Pigouvian level.
OPEC’s price reaction towards a quota R¯ < RM is to charge q(R¯), implying the
welfare function of the climate coalition to read8
W (R¯, po(R¯)) = (1/2)γR¯2 − ψR¯. (8)
Since (1/2)γR¯2 − ψR¯ is a convex function, the welfare maximum is a corner solution
(either 0 or RM ) that leads to strictly lower welfare levels relative to the tax solution.
This result was already pointed out by Strand (2009). However, this conclusion may not
hold true in the presence of small competitive oil suppliers.
3.2 The impact of the competitive fringe
Carbon taxes
In the absence of the competitive fringe, OPEC can always charge its optimal price
po(t) = (1/2)(a− t). However, the small competitors may restrict OPEC’s price setting
behavior to the extent that they prevent OPEC from setting po(t) if their marginal
extraction costs are below that price, i.e. if c < (1/2)(a− t). In this case, OPEC would
8For any R¯ > RM , OPEC optimally reduces its supply to RM and charges q(RM ), thereby making R¯
redundant.
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face no demand at po(t) because the competitors would supply oil at a lower price c.9




(1/2)(a− t) if c ≥ (1/2)(a− t)
c if c < (1/2)(a− t).
(9)
This function alters the welfare maximization problem of the climate coalition from
equation (7) by substituting p∗(t) for po(t). As before, when the climate coalition an-
ticipates OPEC to set p∗(t) = (1/2)(a − t), i.e. when the fringe’s extraction costs are
sufficiently high, it is welfare-optimal to implement to. However, for low extraction costs,
OPEC cannot charge the monopolistic price and the climate coalition anticipates OPEC
to choose p∗(t) = c. Since OPEC cannot exert its market power, the climate coalition is
unable to capture some of OPEC’s rent by setting the carbon tax strategically, implying
the welfare-optimal tax to be the Pigouvian tax tP . For moderate extraction costs, i.e.
for c ∈ [(1/3)(a−ψ); (1/2)(a−ψ)], I show in the Appendix that the climate coalition can
implement either tP or t
o. The welfare-maximizing taxation strategy finally depends on
the fringe’s extraction costs and is reported in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
Let ct ≡ (1/3)(3 −
√
3)(a − ψ). Depending on the marginal extraction costs of the
competitors c, the climate coalition’s optimal tax strategy is given by
t∗(c) =

tP = ψ if c ≤ ct
to = ψ + (1/3)(a− ψ) if c > ct.
(10)
Proof. See Appendix.
9Implicitly, I assume the competitive fringe to be large enough to supply all oil which is a reasonable
assumption given the abundance of shale-oil reserves in the world. Graphically, the existence of the
small competitors alter OPEC’s marginal revenue to the extent that the marginal revenue equals c
as long as the net oil price q(R)− t is above c and drops to MR(t) afterward.
12
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following.10 Choosing to > ψ reduces the
total oil consumption and therefore the consumer surplus excessively, but enables the
climate coalition to appropriate some monopolistic rent. Since to does not depend on the
size of c, a decline of the marginal extraction costs does not affect the tax level and thus
the welfare of this strategy. In contrast, setting the Pigouvian tax perfectly internalizes
the environmental damage and induces OPEC to charge a price of c. A decline of c
then shifts a part of OPEC’s profits to the consumers of the climate coalition. This
increases the consumer surplus and thus the climate coalition’s welfare, implying the
implementation of the Pigouvian tax to become relatively more attractive as c decreases.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is straightforward. As the marginal extraction
costs of OPEC’s competitors decline, e.g. due to technological progress in the shale-oil
industry, the climate coalition may eventually switch from a rent-extraction strategy to
a pure Pigouvian strategy when maximizing its welfare. In fact, the extraction costs of
the major shale-oil fields almost halved between the years 2014 and 2016 according to
Rystad Energy (2016). Thus, if the climate coalition was to use a carbon tax, it would
become more likely that this tax corresponds to the Pigouvian tax that does not contain
a mark-up to extract some rent from OPEC.
Quantity regulation
As in the case of taxation, the existence of the competitive fringe limits OPEC’s price
setting behavior. OPEC’s reaction for a given quota R¯ is illustrated in Figure 2.
10Note that the qualitative result of Proposition 1 and all following Propositions can also been shown
when using a general utility function.
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Figure 2 illustrates the inverse demand function q(R), the supply function of the com-
petitive fringe c > q(RM ) and OPEC’s optimal price p
∗(R¯). The reaction of OPEC
towards an emissions cap R¯ can be divided into three intervals. As in the previous sec-
tion, OPEC reduces its supply to the quantity RM , leading to an exporter price of q(RM )
for R¯ > RM , whereas OPEC marginally undercuts the quota, which implies the exporter
price to be q(R¯) if R¯ ∈ [R(c), RM ]. However, for R¯ < R(c), OPEC also marginally un-
dercuts R¯ and would like to set q(R¯), but cannot do so because the competitive fringe
prevents OPEC from charging q(R¯) > c. Hence, OPEC’s profit maximizing strategy is
to supply R¯ at a price of c. This implies the permit price to be q(R¯) − c > 0 in this
interval, leaving some carbon revenue for the climate coalition.
If the marginal extraction costs were below q(RM ), OPEC would optimally charge a




q(R¯) if R¯ ∈ [R(c), RM ] and c ≥ q(RM )
q(RM ) if R¯ > RM and c ≥ q(RM )
c else,
(11)
while the corresponding quantities are given by
R∗(R¯) =

RM if R¯ > RM and c ≥ q(RM )
R¯ else.
(12)




W (R∗(R¯), p∗(R¯)) s.t. R¯ ≥ 0 (13)
For c < q(RM ), OPEC always charges an oil price of p
∗(R¯) = c, implying the climate
coalition to choose the quota such as to equalize the marginal utility with the social
marginal costs, i.e. the marginal environmental damage plus the oil price. The optimal
quota is given by
R¯∗ = max{(1/γ)(a− c− ψ); 0}. (14)
If a ≤ c + ψ, i.e. if the marginal utility of the first unit of oil does not exceed the
social marginal costs, then the climate coalition optimally implements a quota of zero.
For a > c + ψ, the optimal quota R¯∗ is equivalent to the quantity that results from
implementing the Pigouvian tax tP and it turns out that also the permit price q(R¯
∗)− c
exactly equals tP . Thus, both the allocation and the rent distribution are identical for
both market-based instruments as long as c is not too large. However, for c ≥ q(RM ), the
climate coalition may prefer to pursue another strategy, namely to implement a quota
of RM . To see this, consider Figure 3.
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Figure 3 depicts the inverse demand function q(R), the inverse demand function less
the environmental damage q(R)−ψ, the marginal extraction costs c > q(RM ) as well as
the two potential strategies of the climate coalition R¯∗ and RM . The climate coalition
chooses R¯∗ such that the marginal utility net of the marginal environmental damage
q(R) − ψ equals the oil price c. In this case, the welfare is equal to the area of the
triangle ABC. As c becomes larger, the area of the triangle ABC and thus the welfare of
this strategy declines. Then, the climate coalition may prefer to choose RM , which leads
to an oil price of q(RM ) and yields a welfare of ADE minus EGF. Setting R¯ ∈ (R¯∗;RM )
cannot be welfare-optimal. First, for an increase of R¯ beyond R¯∗, the oil price c exceeds
the marginal utility net of the marginal environmental damage. Second, in the interval
[R(c), RM ], the welfare function is convex due to the same reasons as pointed out in the
previous section, leaving the corner solutions RM and R(c) as potential welfare maxima
in that interval. However, R(c) cannot be optimal because R¯∗ yields a strictly higher
welfare level than R(c), so that the climate coalition’s optimal quota is either R¯∗ (for




Let cq ≡ a − ψ − (1/2)
√
(a− 4ψ)a. Depending on the marginal extraction costs c,
the climate coalition’s optimal quota is given by
R¯∗(c) =

RM = (1/2γ)a if c ≥ cq and a− 4ψ ≥ 0
R¯∗ = max{(1/γ)(a− c− ψ); 0} else.
(15)
Proof. See Appendix.
If a−4ψ < 0, the climate coalition’s welfare when choosing RM would be negative and
therefore welfare inferior relative to choosing a zero quantity that yields a welfare level
of zero. For a− 4ψ ≥ 0, the intuition behind Proposition 2 is that for c sufficiently high,
the climate coalition would optimally set R¯∗ so low (or even equal to zero) such that
there is virtually no consumer surplus anymore. Setting the quota RM instead implies
a drop of the permit price from ψ to zero, but yields a higher consumer surplus, causing
this alternative to be more favorable for large c.
In summary, the existence of the competitive fringe limits the market power of OPEC
and alters OPEC’s best response towards a given quota. For low extraction costs, this
deters the climate coalition from choosing a corner solution that is welfare-inferior to
the tax solution. Proposition 3 compares the carbon tax and cap-and-trade system for
different intervals of c, assuming the climate coalition’s welfare to be non-negative when
choosing a quantity of RM , i.e. assuming a− 4ψ ≥ 0.11
11The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed further below.
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Proposition 3
Let ct ≡ (1/3)(3 −
√
3)(a − ψ) and cq ≡ a − ψ − (1/2)
√
(a− 4ψ)a be the threshold
values for switching the policy strategy in the case of tax and quantity regulation and
assume a − 4ψ ≥ 0. Depending on the marginal extraction costs of the competitive
fringe, the optimal tax t∗(c), the permit price q(R¯∗(c))−p∗(R¯∗(c)), the net oil prices
p∗(t∗(c)) and p∗(R¯∗(c)), the oil quantity R(p∗(t∗(c)) + t∗(c)), and the optimal quota
R¯∗(c) as well as the comparisons between the climate coalition’s welfare levels and
OPEC’s profits are given by the following table:
Table 1: Comparison of instruments
Variable c ≤ ct c ∈ (ct, cq) c ≥ cq
Tax
Carbon tax ψ ψ + (1/3)(a− ψ) ψ + (1/3)(a− ψ)
Oil price c (1/3)(a− ψ) (1/3)(a− ψ)
Quantity (1/γ)(a− c− ψ) (1/3γ)(a− ψ) (1/3γ)(a− ψ)
Quota
Permit price ψ ψ 0
Oil price c c (1/2)a
Quantity (1/γ)(a− c− ψ) (1/γ)(a− c− ψ) 1/(2γ)a
Comparison
Welfare WTax = WQuota WTax > WQuota WTax > WQuota
Profit piTax = piQuota piTax Q piQuota piTax < piQuota
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that a carbon tax is welfare-superior to a cap-and-trade system,
but that both instruments are equivalent for c ≤ ct, which is the main result of the present
paper. The reason is that the competitors with low marginal extraction costs restrict
OPEC’s price setting behavior, forcing OPEC to set its oil price equal to the fringe’s
costs, which finally prevents OPEC from exerting its market power. By anticipating this,
the climate coalition sets the levels of its instrument as if there was perfect competition
in the oil market, causing both instruments to be equivalent. Thus, in the presence
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of a competitive fringe with low marginal extraction costs, the result of Strand (2009)
does not hold anymore. However, for c > ct, OPEC can exert its market power and
the climate coalition is strictly better off when using a price rather than a quantity
instrument. Relative to a tax, cap-and-trade allows OPEC to extract a larger share of
the climate rent. However, this does not imply that OPEC’s profits are generally higher
under quantity regulation because the climate coalition may optimally set a very low
quota. In this case, the climate coalition’s welfare as well as OPEC’s profit approach zero
and both players are better off under tax regulation. For c ≥ cq, OPEC strictly prefers
quantity regulation, whereas the climate coalition is better off under tax regulation
provided that a − 4ψ ≥ 0. Remember that for a − 4ψ < 0, it will never be beneficial
for the climate coalition to set a quota equal to the monopolistic quantity, so that the
second column of Table 1 remains valid also beyond cq.
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Numerical example
Figure 4 uses a numerical example with a = 10, ψ = 1 and γ = 1 to illustrate the climate
coalition’s welfare and OPEC’s profits depending on c.
Figure 4: Comparison of tax and quantity regulation
(a) Welfare
ct qc
















Legend: Dotted graph is tax regulation, dashed graph is quota regulation.
12For c ≥ a − ψ, the climate coalition optimally implements a quota of zero. In this case, a marginal
increase of R¯ from zero would induce OPEC to charge a price of q(0) = a as long as c ≥ a, which
implies the permit price to be zero. If a − ψ ≤ c < a, then OPEC can charge c at most and the
permit price would be q(0)− c = a− c in this case.
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In the interval c ≤ ct, both regulations are equivalent. Since the costs for oil of the
climate coalition respectively the oil revenue of OPEC are increasing in c, the consumer
surplus and thus the welfare are decreasing, whereas profits are increasing in c. Beyond ct
the climate coalition switches its tax strategy from tP towards t
o so that OPEC charges
a price that only depends on the tax level, but not on c, implying both welfare and
profit to remain constant. For c > cq, the climate coalition optimally chooses a quota of
RM , which is why the welfare and the profit under quantity regulation do not change in
this interval. Note that the climate coalition is strictly better off under a carbon tax for
c > ct, whereas OPEC’s profit is lower when facing carbon taxation relative to a quota.
4 Quantity regulation with base tax
In order to retain some of the carbon revenue, Scho¨b (2010) proposes to complement
the cap-and-trade system by levying a base tax, i.e. a per unit tax on the consumption
of the resource. This proposal is analyzed in the following. When the climate coalition
implements a quota R¯ with a base tax tb, Figure 5 illustrates OPEC’s reaction in the
absence of the competitive fringe.


















Figure 5 shows the quota R¯, effective demand functions Re(q, R¯) and Re(q− tb, R¯) as
well as the marginal revenue MR(R, tb). Abstracting from the base tax, OPEC’s best
reaction towards any quota R¯ ≤ RM is to charge q(R¯). Complementing the quota R¯
with a base tax tb forces OPEC to reduce its oil price from q(R¯) to q(R¯)− tb and allows
the climate coalition to appropriate a part of the climate rent equal to tb · R¯.
Suppose that R¯ was the optimal quota, then the climate coalition can do no better
than setting tb. Any base tax below tb would yield the same oil consumption, but a
lower carbon revenue. Setting the base tax above tb leads OPEC to reduce its supply to
some R < R¯, which is welfare-inferior because R¯ was assumed to be the optimal quota.
Thus, for any given quota R¯ ≤ RM , there is exactly one optimal complementary base
tax, which should be chosen such that the marginal revenue of OPEC equals zero at R¯.
Formally, the one-to-one relationship between quota and optimal base tax results from
the profit maximization of OPEC, which is given by
∂pi(R, tb)
∂R
= MR(R, tb) = a− tb − 2γR != 0 ⇔ Ro(tb) = (1/2γ)(a− tb). (16)
Putting it differently, in order to implement any desired quantity, the climate coalition
only needs to set the base tax accordingly. This result also holds true in the presence of
the competitive fringe. In this case, OPEC’s profit maximizing quantity when facing a
base tax only is given by13
R∗(tb, c) =

(1/2γ)(a− tb) if c ≥ (1/2)(a− tb)
(1/γ)(a− c− tb) if c < (1/2)(a− tb).
(17)
The climate coalition can induce OPEC to supply any desired quantity by choosing
the base tax appropriately. More importantly, the climate coalition cannot improve its
welfare by choosing a quota other than R∗(tb, c). Setting a quota R¯ > R∗(tb, c) makes
13This follows from equations (9) and (4).
21
this quota redundant because OPEC’s actual supply is lower. On the other side, if a
quota R¯ < R∗(tb, c) was optimal for the climate coalition, then the climate coalition
could achieve a higher welfare level by increasing the base tax such that OPEC indeed
supplies R¯. By doing this, the climate coalition appropriates a larger share of OPEC’s
rent while consuming the same quantity R¯. In summary, also in the presence of a com-
petitive fringe, there is a one-to-one relationship between the base tax and OPEC’s oil
supply. To implement the welfare maximizing quantity, the climate coalition only needs
to set the base tax appropriately and cannot improve its welfare by choosing a quota
other than OPEC’s profit maximizing oil supply. Proposition 4 reports the implication
of this finding.
Proposition 4
The quantity regulation with a complementary base tax is equivalent to the tax
regulation.
Proof. Follows immediately from the one-to-one relationship between the base tax
and OPEC’s profit maximizing oil supply.
Proposition 4 shows that by using a cap-and-trade system that is complemented by
the optimal base tax, the climate coalition is neither worse off nor better off relative
to the use of a carbon tax. The reason is that once the base tax is set optimally, the
climate coalition cannot increase its welfare when setting a quota other than OPEC’s
profit maximizing oil supply.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper analyzes the impact of declining extraction costs of the competitive fringe
on the choice of the climate policy instrument in a strategic game between a climate
coalition and a dominant oil supplier such as OPEC. I show that, from the perspective
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of the climate coalition, a pure cap-and-trade system turns out to be weakly welfare-
inferior relative to a carbon tax, while a cap-and-trade system that is accompanied by
a base tax is equivalent to a carbon tax.
The marginal extraction costs of the competitive fringe constitute an upper bound for
the price, OPEC can charge and thus impact the climate coalition’s optimal tax strategy.
High extraction costs allow OPEC to exert its market power and to charge the monop-
olistic price. Anticipating this, the climate coalition chooses a tax that both extracts
some of OPEC’s monopolistic rent and accounts for the damage from global warming.
However, low marginal extraction costs prevent OPEC from exerting its market power,
causing the climate coalition to optimally set the Pigouvian tax.
Relative to a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade system enables OPEC to extract a larger
share of the climate rent by marginally undercutting the climate coalition’s quota. Since
the oil price cannot exceed the fringe’s marginal extraction costs, lower costs limit the
rent extraction of OPEC, leaving more revenue for the climate coalition. If the marginal
extraction costs are sufficiently low, then the climate coalition will optimally choose the
quota that is equivalent to the quantity that would have resulted from implementing the
Pigouvian tax, implying both instruments to be equivalent.
The findings of this paper suggest that in the presence of a dominant oil supplier that
faces competition from small oil extractors with higher extraction costs, a carbon tax
should be preferred over a cap-and-trade system, confirming the implications of earlier
papers such as Berg et al. (1997), Strand (2011), Wirl (2012) and Strand (2013). In fact,
there are many other economic arguments, including lower administration costs or the
absence of carbon price volatility, for why carbon taxes are superior to cap-and-trade.
This superiority suggests that in the international climate negotiations in the coming
years, the conference of the parties should rather aim at establishing a common carbon
price than at negotiating country-specific emissions reduction targets. However, in the
Paris Agreement, the conference of the parties committed themselves to fixed emissions
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reduction targets. Even though it remains to be seen which policy instrument each
country will finally implement, it seems to be likely that cap-and-trade will turn out as
the predominant climate policy instrument.
The political preference for cap-and-trade relative to carbon taxes originates primar-
ily from two reasons. First, climate science suggests the existence of tipping points,
i.e. dramatic, discontinuous, and irreversible changes of the climate system that occur
after passing certain temperature or emissions concentration thresholds. Given the un-
certainty about the marginal abatement costs, imposing adequate quotas guarantees to
avoid passing these thresholds, while carbon taxes do not. Second, carbon taxes seem
to lack political support at a national level in some major emitting countries such as the
United States, where the political climate is characterized by a general resistance to any
new taxes. In contrast, launching emissions trading schemes is likely to come along with
a generous allocation of free emissions certificates for the regulated industries, which
reduces the compliance costs. While firms bear both the abatement costs and the tax
payments when facing a carbon tax, they incur only the abatement costs in the case of a
cap-and-trade that allocates the allowances free of charge. This makes the private sector
and the special interest groups less likely to oppose a cap-and-trade system relative to a
carbon tax.
Provided that carbon taxes are politically not feasible, so that the conference of the
parties needs to agree on quantities, the policy implication of this paper is that the
quantity regulation should be complemented by levying a base tax. The base tax re-
distributes some rent from OPEC as tax revenues to the governments of the climate
coalition, which potentially could pass the revenue on to the regulated firms. If the
implementation of a base tax was politically not feasible, the climate coalition could
accompany the cap-and-trade system by a floor price instead. A floor price is formally
equivalent to a base tax and thus also guarantees the appropriation of some rent from
OPEC. The regulated industries could be compensated by allocating a substantial share
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of allowances free of charge, making the ratification at the national level more likely.
Future research could, firstly, incorporate more than one fuel, e.g. oil and natural gas
or coal, as partly done by Berger et al. (1992) and Strand (2011). Their analyses indicate
that the (uncorrelated) demand for the second fuel and thus for emissions allowances
limits OPEC’s rent extraction in a cap-and-trade system. Secondly, the model employed
in the present paper is static, whereas the extraction of exhaustible resources is inherently
a dynamic problem. Thus, a possible extension would analyze the research question of




Amundsen, E. S. and R. Scho¨b (1999). Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources.
European Journal of Political Economy 15 (2), 311–329.
Berg, E., S. Kverndokk, and K. E. Rosendahl (1997). Market power, international CO2
taxation and oil wealth. The Energy Journal 18 (4), 33–71.
Berger, K., F. Øyvind, R. Golombek, and M. Hoel (1992). The oil market and interna-
tional agreements on CO2 emissions. Resources and Energy 14 (4), 315–336.
Bergstrom, B. T. C. (1982). On capturing oil rents with a national excise tax. The
American Economic Review 72 (1), 194–201.
Eichner, T. and R. Pethig (2011). Carbon leakage, the green paradox, and perfect future
markets. International Economic Review 52 (3), 767–805.
Eisenack, K., O. Edenhofer, and M. Kalkuhl (2012). Resource rents: The effects of energy
taxes and quantity instruments for climate protection. Energy Policy 48, 159–166.
Goulder, L. H. and A. R. Schein (2013). Carbon taxes versus cap and trade: A critical
review. Climate Change Economics 4 (3), 1–28.
IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups
I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva,
Switzerland.
Karp, L. and D. M. Newbery (1991). Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resources. Journal
of International Economics 30 (3-4), 285–299.
Karp, L., S. Siddiqui, and J. Strand (2015). Dynamic climate policy with both strate-
gic and non-strategic agents: Taxes versus quantities. Environmental and Resource
Economics 65 (1), 135–158.
26
Keutiben, O. (2014). On capturing foreign oil rents. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics 36 (2), 542–555.
Knoema (2014). Cost of oil production by country. https://knoema.com/vyronoe/cost-
of-oil-production-by-country .
Liski, M. and O. Tahvonen (2004). Can carbon tax eat OPEC’s rents? Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 47 (1), 1–12.
Rubio, S. J. and L. Escriche (2001). Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities
and polluting non-renewable resources. Journal of Public Economics 79 (2), 297–313.
Rystad Energy (2016). North american shale report.
https://www.rystadenergy.com/NewsEvents/PressReleases/shale-well-breakeven.
Scho¨b, R. (2010). Climate policy: Reaping an additional employment dividend. Public
Finance and Management 10 (2), 251–283.
Strand, J. (2009). Who Gains and Who Loses by Fossil-Fuel Taxes and Caps: Importers
Versus Exporters. Unpublished, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Strand, J. (2011). Taxes and caps as climate policy instruments with domestic and
imported fuels. In G. Metcalf (Ed.), U.S. Energy Tax Policy, Chapter 7, pp. 233–268.
Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.
Strand, J. (2013). Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Car-
bon taxes versus cap-and-trade. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment 66 (2), 202–218.
UNFCCC (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Paris: United Nations.
Wirl, F. (1995). The exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming
and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 5 (4), 333–352.
27
Wirl, F. (2012). Global warming: Prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64 (2), 217–229.
Wirl, F. and E. Dockner (1995). Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and
potential benefits. European Economic Review 39 (6), 1215–1236.
28
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First, I show that for c ∈ [(1/3)(a − ψ), (1/2)(a − ψ)] the climate coalition can either
implement tP = ψ or t
o = ψ + (1/3)(a − ψ). If the climate coalition sets to, then
OPEC indeed chooses p∗(to) = (1/2)(a− to) = (1/3)(a−ψ) as long as c ≥ (1/3)(a−ψ).
If the climate coalition sets tP , then OPEC cannot implement its profit maximizing
price p∗(tP ) = (1/2)(a − tP ) = (1/2)(a − ψ) for c ≤ (1/2)(a − ψ). Hence, if c ∈
[(1/3)(a − ψ), (1/2)(a − ψ)], then the climate coalition can implement either tP or to.
The respective welfare levels are given by
W (R(p∗(to) + to), p∗(to)) = (1/6γ)(a− ψ)2 (A.1)
W (R(c+ ψ), c) = (1/2γ)(a− c− ψ)2. (A.2)
It follows that (1/2γ)(a−c−ψ)2 ≥ (1/6γ)(a−ψ)2 as long as c ≤ (1/3)(3−√3)(a−ψ) ≡ ct
which proofs Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Depending on c, the climate coalition either sets R¯∗ = max{(1/γ)(a − c − ψ); 0} or
RM = (1/2γ)a. The respective welfare levels are given by
W (R∗(R¯∗), p∗(R¯∗)) =

(1/2γ)(a− c− ψ)2 if c ≤ a− ψ
0 if c > a− ψ
(A.3)
W (R∗(RM ), p∗(RM )) = (1/8γ)(a− 4ψ)a. (A.4)
Note that W (R∗(RM ), p∗(RM )) is positive for a − 4ψ ≥ 0 and thus welfare-superior to
R¯∗ = 0. The quota RM is welfare-superior to R¯∗ > 0 as long as (1/8γ)(a − 4ψ)a ≥
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(1/2γ)(a− c−ψ)2, which holds true for c ≥ a−ψ− (1/2)√(a− 4ψ)a ≡ cq. This proofs
Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
The first three lines of Table 1 follow from the proof of Proposition 1 and from equations
(4) and (9). The lines four to six are proved by the proof of Proposition 2, equations
(11) and (15) as well as the fact that the permit price is given by q(R¯∗(c))− p∗(R¯∗(c)).
For the seventh line, the first two entries immediately follow from the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Using (A.1) and (A.4) and noting that (1/6γ)(a−ψ)2 > (1/8γ)(a−4ψ)a proofs
the last entry.
For the last line, we have
pi(p = c, t = ψ) = (1/γ)(a− c− ψ)c (A.5)
pi(p = (1/3)(a− ψ), t = ψ + (1/3)(a− ψ)) = (1/9γ)(a− ψ)2 (A.6)
pi(p = (1/2)a, t = 0) = (1/4γ)a2 (A.7)
The first entry of the last line is obvious. For the third entry, we have (1/4γ)a2 >
(1/9γ)(a− ψ)2. For the second entry, note that pi(p = c, t = ψ) approaches zero when c
approaches a−ψ, implying pi(p = (1/3)(a−ψ), t = ψ+ (1/3)(a−ψ)) > pi(p = c, t = ψ).
However, the opposite holds true at, e.g. c = ct, where pi(p = c, t = ψ)|c=ct − pi(p =
(1/3)(a − ψ), t = ψ + (1/3)(a − ψ))|c=ct = (1/9γ)(3
√
3 − 1)(a − ψ)2 > 0, which proofs
the ambiguous relation sign in the second entry of the last line.
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